EFFECTS OF BUDGETARY CONTROL DESIGN ON MANAGEMENT DECISIONS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*
研究发现，管理层控制的企业在进入壁垒高的行业中会分配更多预算松弛资源，导致资源分配低效和利润表现不佳。
An examination of budgetary slack behavior reveals that managerial characteristics and the economic environment may contribute to the failure of budgetary control systems. Large management‐controlled firms that operate in industries with high barriers to entry behave as if they allocate more slack resources when compared with owner‐controlled firms of similar size and market power. The results confirm that accounting operating‐income numbers reflect manifestations of slack behavior in the budgetary process. Management‐controlled firms in particular seem to act as if they fail to release and redistribute slack resources. It is concluded that budgetary slack behavior points to failures in the organization design that may lead to inefficient allocation of resources and to inferior profit performance.