Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
构建了一个模型，其中行为人对社会尊重的效用取决于观众，解释了控制体系和金钱激励如何通过信号传递削弱代理人积极性，以及高薪和使命导向型委托人为何能激励代理人。
Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal-agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.