Is no News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model
研究当代理人拥有项目成功可能性的私人信号时，委托人如何设计最优激励合同来获取该信号，并发现干预会削弱激励，因此委托人需承诺不取消某些负预期收益的项目，并通过奖励来鼓励代理人报告坏消息。
The standard principal-agent model neglects the potentially important role of information transmission from agent to principal. We study optimal incentive contracts when the agent has a private signal of the likelihood of the project’s success. We show that the principal can costlessly extract this signal if and only if this does not lead her to intervene in the project in any way that will influence its outcome. Intervention undermines incentives by weakening the link between the agent’s initial effort and the project’s outcome. If possible, the principal commits not to cancel some projects with negative expected payoffs. To elicit early warning, contracts must reward agents for coming forward with bad news. I want you to tell me exactly what’s wrong with me and M.G.M., even if it means losing your job.