Toward Natural Implementation
在交换经济中识别了“自然”机制应满足的基本条件，给出了社会选择对应能被自然机制在纳什均衡中实施的充要条件，并证明了无嫉妒对应和公平对应分别可由特定机制实施。
The authors identify some fundamental conditions that a 'natural' mechanism should satisfy in exchange economies. First, they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be implemented in Nash equilibria by natural mechanisms. Second, they show that the class of social choice correspondences implementable by (price and) two-quantity mechanisms is equivalent to the class of social choice correspondences implementable by (price and) allocation mechanisms. Third, the authors find that the no-envy correspondence is implementable by a two-quantity mechanism and the fair correspondence is implementable by a price-quantity mechanism. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.