Discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions
利用发行前交易数据，比较美国国债统一拍卖与歧视性拍卖的效果，发现统一拍卖能增加信息释放、降低拍卖前不确定性和轧空风险，但加价比较结果不一。
We use when-issued transactions data to assess the Treasury's current experiment with uniform auctions. When-issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winner's curse. Under uniform auctions, when-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results.