Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice Between Privacy and Publicity
将隐私建模为他人无法观察个人行动，分析行动可观察性如何影响个人行为扭曲和公共品供给，并比较隐私与公开政策的最优性。
We model privacy as an agent's choice of action being unobservable to others. An agent derives utility from his action, the aggregate of agents' actions, and other agents' perceptions of his type. If his action is unobservable, he takes his full-information optimal action and is pooled with other types, while if observable, then he distorts it to enhance others' perceptions of him. This increases the public good, but the disutility from distortion is a social cost. When the disutility of distortion is high (low) relative to the marginal utility of the public good, a policy of privacy (publicity) is optimal.