A Theory of Mutual Formation and Moral Hazard with Evidence from the History of the Insurance Industry
研究非营利互助保险和银行组织的形成原因，通过历史证据支持其作为应对总体不确定性和道德风险的有效契约安排，并指出信息不对称比代理问题更能解释其合同类型。
Nonprofit, mutually owned insurance and banking organizations have significant market shares in the insurance and banking industries. A first step in a systematic study of these financial mutuals is to examine the reasons for their formation. Doing so provides empirical support for the view that these mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard. A formal model with this property is presented. We argue that information asymmetries do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by financial mutuals than do agency problems between owners, managers, and customers.