Not all Risk Taking is Born Equal: The Behavioral Agency Model and CEO's Perception of Firm Efficacy
研究了CEO风险承担（源于股票期权或现金薪酬）如何因CEO对企业效能的感知不同而影响绩效结果，发现高感知效能时风险承担提升绩效，低感知效能时则相反。
We examine the relationship between agent ( CEO ) risk bearing and the quality of executive risk‐taking outcomes, by examining the contingency effect of CEO perceived firm efficacy. In doing so, we extend the behavioral agency model ( BAM ) beyond predictions of risk magnitude to examining how CEO risk‐taking outcomes differ qualitatively in response to risk bearing. We argue that CEO risk bearing (due to stock options or cash compensation) will positively influence performance outcomes in the presence of higher perceived firm efficacy. However, this positive influence reverses when efficacy is lower. We demonstrate the utility of firm efficacy in exploring the effect of agent risk bearing on performance outcomes and provide the insight that the CEO pay‐performance relationship is influenced by the CEO ’s perception of firm efficacy. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.