Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline?
研究欧盟新成员及潜在成员国的预算过程，发现政治因素主导预算赤字，但预算制度中的制衡机制能有效抑制财政压力，即使政治无纪律且长期结构不利。
type="main" xml:lang="en"> The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences, but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions – mechanisms and rules of the budget process – that create checks and balances have significant value in curbing fiscal pressures even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavourable. — Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody