Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest
建立模型说明管理层抵制收购（如绿票讹诈）可能增加股东财富，因为减少竞购者并传递目标公司无白衣骑士的信号，解释了抵制后股价下跌但长期价值最大化的现象。
This article develops a model in which greenmail and other forms of management resistance to takeovers can benefit shareholders. In particular, discouraging some potential acquirers may increase shareholder wealth because it encourages others to pursue a combination with the target. This occurs because the number of competing acquirers is reduced and because resistance can signal that the target does not have access to a white knight. This signalling effect may explain why share prices decline after management resists a takeover, even when such resistance is value-maximizing in the long run.