Alternative Models of Managerial Behavior: Empirical Tests for the Petroleum Industry
利用石油企业面板数据，检验了两种关于管理低效的竞争性假说，结果支持自由现金流代理理论，表明重组减少现金流会抑制勘探、竞标租赁和研发投资。
Explanations for takeovers often focus on managerial inefficiency as an explanation. This paper utilizes panel data for a set of petroleum firms to test two competing hypotheses about managerial inefficiency--the heterogeneous managerial model versus the free cash flow variant of agency theory. By focusing on specific investment categories like exploration, bidding and leasing activity, and R$50D, the effects of changes in management and cash flow are better isolated. The empirical results provide considerable support for the free cash flow variant of agency theory showing that reduced cash flow due to restructuring will curtail investments in exploration, bidding and leasing activity, and R$50D. Copyright 1989 by MIT Press.