Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values
分析标价销售程序在交易具有显著共同价值元素时的表现，刻画了卖方在完全揭示完美均衡中的报价策略，并比较了密封投标和直接揭示机制下的均衡行为，发现共同价值程度越高，互利协议越难达成。
The seller posted-price procedure is probably the most common method for making transactions in modern economies. We analyze the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common-value elements. In a model of two-sided private information, we characterize the fully revealing, perfect equilibrium offer strategy of the seller. We also characterize equilibrium behavior under two other pricing procedures—a sealed-bid procedure and a direct revelation mechanism. Finally, we examine the efficiency of these procedures and show that as the degree of common values increases, fewer mutually beneficial agreements are attained.