Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance
将纵向一体化的交易成本模型扩展到多边环境，研究下游企业争夺有限投入品时的供应保障问题，分析不同一体化结构的影响、社会最优结构及其与均衡结构的差异。
This paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings. Its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply. Integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others. Therefore, to explain the scope of any firm, one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations. Three fundamental questions are addressed: (1) What are the effects of different integration structures?; (2) What are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures?; (3) In what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures?