Civil war and U.S. foreign influence
研究外国干预如何影响全球内战，通过博弈模型分析美国党派和总统支持率与内战发生概率的关系，发现共和党执政时内战更可能发生，总统支持率高则内战概率降低。
We study how foreign interventions affect civil war around the world. In an infinitely repeated game we combine a gambling for resurrection mechanism for the influencing country with the canonical bargaining model of war in the influenced country to micro-found sudden shifts in power among the domestic bargaining partners, which are known to lead to war due to commitment problems. We test two of our model predictions that allow us to identify the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with the U.S. presidential approval rates. These results withstand several robustness checks and, overall, suggest that foreign influence is a sizable driver of domestic conflict.