Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms
研究了在有限责任下，如何设计机制从n个项目中选出至多m个，通过转移支付获取项目质量信息，并发现最优选择规则只依赖于可观察特征而非报告质量。
We study mechanisms for selecting up to m out of n projects. Project managers' private information on quality is elicited through transfers. Under limited liability, the optimal mechanism selects projects that maximize some function of the project's observable and reported characteristics. When all reported qualities exceed their own project-specific thresholds, the selected set only depends on observable characteristics, not reported qualities. Each threshold is related to (i) the outside option level at which the cost and benefit of eliciting information on the project cancel out and (ii) the optimal value of selecting one among infinitely many ex ante identical projects.