Derivatives Use, Corporate Governance, and Legislative Change: An Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Listed Companies
研究新西兰上市公司董事会构成是否影响衍生品使用，并检验1993年新公司法实施后衍生品使用是否变化。发现高增长机会和外部董事比例高的公司在新法后更少使用衍生品，说明内部治理机制和立法环境会影响衍生品政策。
Abstract: This paper examines if board composition has any systematic bearing on derivatives usage by New Zealand listed companies. We also test if derivative usage changed following the introduction of the new 1993 Companies Act. The Act raised expectations of directors’ fiduciary responsibilities and the perceived risk of liability on outside directors for poor investment decisions. Using a dataset of listed New Zealand companies in 1994 and 1997, we find companies with higher growth opportunities and a greater proportion of outside directors were less likely to use financial derivatives following the introduction of the new Act. Our results supplement the US‐based literature on derivatives usage by illustrating that internal governance mechanisms can play a role in corporate derivatives policy, and that the legislative and regulatory environment may affect this role.