Counteroffers and Efficiency in Labor Markets with Asymmetric Information
研究当现任雇主比潜在雇主更了解工人生产力时，反报价机制如何影响劳动力市场结果，发现反报价可能实现有效均衡，且人力资本投资达到最优水平。
This article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker's productivity than potential employers. Previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers, the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker's qualifications. As a result, assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient. I find that when current employers can match outside offers, the equilibrium outcome may be efficient. I analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers, and find these investment levels to be first best.