Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model
研究企业现金流受经理人不可观测努力和外部可观测冲击影响时，最优薪酬合同为何会奖励经理人的运气，与标准契约理论预测相反。
This article studies a continuous time principal-agent problem of a firm whose cash flows are determined by the manager's unobserved effort. The firm's cash flows are further subject to persistent and publicly observable shocks that are beyond the manager's control. While standard contracting models predict that compensation should optimally filter out these shocks, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In line with this evidence, our model predicts that the manager is "rewarded for luck." The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.