Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate
批判了用蒂布特模型的市场隐喻来支持美国联邦权力下放的做法，指出政府进入和退出成本高、公共部门合谋有益、人口流动异质性扭曲信号，且权力下放伴随不平等加剧，可能削弱而非改善政府效能。
The market metaphor of intergovernmental choice as a spur to efficiency (formalized by Charles M. Tiebout) is often invoked to support the shift away from Washington and toward the states. But the model translates badly to governments; governmental entry and exit is costly. Public-sector co11usion often serves citizens' interests. Heterogeneous mobility distorts the signals sent by interstate migration. And while Tiebout (and followers) condition efficiency predictions on optimal distribution, the U.S. devolution movement coincides with rising inequality and has gone furthest where distribution matters most. The metaphor is misapplied. Devolution will likely do more to enfeeble government than to improve it.