Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts
研究公司如何通过提供工作相关福利（如公司飞机、豪华办公室）来优化激励与保险之间的权衡，从而设计最优激励合同，并分析了不确定性、高管层级和公司治理对福利消费的影响。
Work‐related perks, such as corporate jets, nice offices, and so forth, improve the tradeoff between incentives and insurance that determines the optimal incentive contract. We show that (i) such perks may be offered even if their direct consumption benefits are offset by their costs; (ii) they will be offered for free; (iii) agents in more uncertain production environments will receive more perks; (iv) senior executives should receive more perks; and (v) better corporate governance can lead to more perk consumption by CEOs. Our analysis also offers insights into firms' decisions about how much autonomy they should grant to their employees.