The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
提出一套立法机构理论，类比企业理论和契约制度理论，说明立法机构如何执行议员间的交易、为何非市场交换优于市场交换，以及委员会制度如何限制联盟形成。适合研究制度经济学和政治经济学的学者判断是否阅读原文。
This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or preferences of individuals (here, representatives seeking reelection) and the relevant transactions costs. The authors present three conclusions. First, they show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators. Second, they explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange. Third, their approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.