Prices versus Quantities: The Political Perspective
比较了受利益集团影响的两种规制制度（价格控制与数量控制），发现价格控制相对于配额的优势随需求或供给弹性增大而增强，随受规制行业有组织生产者数量增多而减弱；对于负外部性可排序，正外部性则不能；更有效的资源配置也意味着更少的寻租资源消耗。
Regulation regimes subject to the influence of interest groups are compared. It is shown that the allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices (versus quotas) increases with the elasticity of the demand for or the supply of the commodity and decreases with the number of organized producers in the regulated industry. Control regimes can be ranked for negative, but not positive, externalities. Finally, a control regime leading to a more efficient commodity allocation also entails using fewer resources in rent-seeking activities. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.