Incentive Schemes for Local Government: Theory and Evidence from Comprehensive Performance Assessment in England
研究英格兰综合绩效评估（CPA）对地方政府的影响，发现CPA提高了服务质量和房产税，但对效率无显著影响，且对选举竞争弱的地区影响更大。
This paper studies Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive scheme for local government in England. Motivated by a theoretical political agency model, we predict that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous effect on the efficiency of service provision. We test these predictions using Welsh local governments as a control group: CPA increased the property tax, and our index of service quality, but had no significant effect on efficiency overall. There is evidence of a heterogenous effect of CPA: it impacted more on councils where electoral competition was initially weak, in line with our theory.