Informative Externalities and Pricing in Regulated Multiproduct Industries
研究了当监管者无法观察产品需求水平时，如何组织生产两种相互依赖产品的行业，比较了多产品垄断和差异化双寡头两种结构，发现替代品时整合更优，互补品时分散更优。
This paper addresses the issue of how to organise a two‐product industry with interdependent demands when the regulator cannot observe the demand level of the goods produced. Two industry structures are compared: a multiproduct monopoly, in which an informed firm produces both goods, and a differentiated duopoly, where two firms control one good each but the level of demand is known by one firm only. Focusing on the informative costs of regulation, the paper shows that, if goods are substitutes, the regulator may achieve a better performance through integration of production. With complements, instead, decentralisation tends to be preferred.