A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
描述了一个由无限多异质买家和卖家组成的经济中的拍卖竞争性分布，其中卖家无法通过偏离到其他直接机制来提高利润，且每个参与者的最优反应独立于对其他参与者偏好的信念。
In this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded. A competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism. It is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller's best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market.