Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information
研究了带有私人信息和截止日期的动态讨价还价，发现截止日期效应：交易在截止日期前平稳进行，并在截止时刻集中发生。分歧选项越差，交易越多，且更多协议在截止日期前达成。
We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear “deadline effect.” That is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade, and the deadline effect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place on the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can affect the overall efficiency of the equilibrium nonmonotonically. For intermediate deadlines, efficiency is improved if agents face bleaker prospects after deadline.