A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation
构建一个模型，说明收入不平等上升会导致财政分权，使地方辖区收入更同质，进而促使政府更多依赖私人提供公共品。
Along with the rise in income inequality in the US, there is evidence of a simultaneous move towards fiscal devolution and increased government reliance on private provision of public goods. This article argues that these phenomena are related. We describe a model of jurisdiction and policy formation in which the structure of government provision is endogenous and public good provision levels are determined by a political process that can exploit private motives for voluntary giving. The model predicts that an increase in income inequality leads to decentralisation, with local jurisdictions becoming more income-homogeneous than the population as a whole. This reduction in local income heterogeneity, combined with a reduced tax base, results in increased reliance by government on private provision. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).