A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
提出一个压力集团竞争政治影响力的理论模型，分析政治均衡如何取决于各集团施压效率、额外压力的影响、群体规模以及税收补贴的额外成本，并指出政府纠正市场失灵与偏袒政治强势群体这两种现象均源于政治寻租竞争。
This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: both are produced by the competition for political favors.