Do Donors Discount Low-Quality Accounting Information?
研究发现，平均而言捐赠者只会对最简单、最明显的项目比率操纵进行折价，且这种折价行为在1998年数据可得性变化后才出现；更成熟的捐赠者会对更复杂的操纵施加更大的折价。
ABSTRACT Prior research finds that donors reward nonprofits that report larger program ratios with more donations and that program ratios frequently are subject to intentional manipulation as well as unintentional errors. We examine how donors react to low-quality ratios. We find that the average donor discounts ratios that are inflated by only the simplest and most observable of methods. We then examine the effect of financial data availability on the average donor's ability to unravel inflated ratios by using the historical shift in data availability that occurred in 1997 and 1998. We find that donors began to discount ratios only after 1998. Finally, we examine whether the discount applied to program ratios varies across donor sophistication (measured as the percentage of fund balances with restrictions) and find that sophisticated donors apply incrementally larger discounts to inflated ratios and discount ratios that are inflated by more complex methods. JEL Classifications: G1; G18; G3; G38; L3; L30; L31; M4; M41; M43; M48 Data Availability: The data are available from public sources identified in this study.