Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset Markets
提出信息部分揭示模型，通过14个计算机化双向拍卖实验室市场检验，发现该模型在解释信息市场价值、分配和资产配置上优于完全揭示模型和非揭示预期模型，但在解释资产价格上不如完全揭示模型。
ABSTRACT We develop a model of market efficiency assuming private information is partially revealed to uninformed traders via the behavior of those who are informed. This partial revelation of information (PRE) model is tested in fourteen computerized double auction laboratory markets. It explains the market value and allocation of purchased information, and asset allocations, better than either a fully revealing information model (FRE strong‐form efficiency) or a nonrevealing expectations model; but it takes second place to FRE in explaining asset prices. We conjecture that refined versions of PRE may provide insight into “technical analysis” and minibubbles in securities markets.