A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments
构建了一个结构模型，解释被试在重复协调博弈中的行为，假设行动是对对手选择的随机最优反应，并通过实验数据估计先验信念分布，发现收敛于风险占优均衡。
Abstract This paper constructs a structural model for behavior in expeiments where subjects play a simple coordination game repeatedly under a rotating partner scheme. The model assumes subjects’ actions are stochastic best responses to beliefs about opponents’ choices, and these beliefs update as subjects observe actual choices during the experiment. The model accounts for heterogeneity across subjects by regarding prior beliefs as random effects and estimating their distribution. Maximum likelihood estimates from experimental data suggest that distributions of initial beliefs vary across games, but in all games studied imply a convergence dynamic toward risk-dominant equilibrium.