CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry
利用1996-2008年美国上游油气公司的衍生品数据，发现CEO固守程度和自由现金流代理成本越高，企业对冲强度越大；同时，降低财务困境和借款成本也是重要动机。
Abstract Using a unique data set with detailed information on the derivative positions of upstream oil and gas firms during 1996–2008, we find that hedging intensity is positively related to factors that amplify chief executive officer (CEO) entrenchment and free cash flow agency costs. There is also robust evidence that hedging is motivated by the reduction of financial distress and borrowing costs, and that it is influenced by both intrinsic cash flow risk and temporary spikes in commodity price volatility. We present a comprehensive perspective on the determinants of corporate hedging, and the results are consistent with the predictions of the risk management and agency costs literatures.