Monitoring the Principal with Multiple Agents
研究委托人和多个代理人都提供不可验证投入时的双重道德风险问题，发现当委托人投入对两个代理人公开时，平衡预算契约能完全解决双重道德风险，且实现最优均衡。
Double moral hazard arises in the principal-agent model when both parties provide a nonverifiable input following contracting. Balanced-budget contracts are generally second best. If the principal's input is public to two agents, which often characterizes franchising, for example, then balanced-budget contracts exist that resolve fully double moral hazard. Agent payoffs depend on both outputs to correct principal moral hazard, rather than correlation in random effects on outputs. The equilibrium in first-best choices implemented by the contract is also unique and coalition-proof.