Strategic Equilibrium of Tariffs and General Equilibrium
构建了一个国际贸易的一般均衡模型，其中政府以关税为战略变量，在消费者偏好不完全且可传递性缺失的情况下，研究政府如何选择关税以最大化国内消费者的估计偏好，并证明均衡的存在性。
We construct a general equilibrium model of international trade where each government agent has a system of tariffs as his strategic variables. Our general equilibrium model follows recent contributions allowing incompleteness and intransitivity of consumer preferences. Government agents are assumed to have incomplete information on the preferences of domestic consumers and the availability of commodities. The behavior of each government agent is to choose a system of tariffs to maximize the estimated preferences of domestic consumers with a constraint on an estimated availability of commodities. We introduce an equilibrium concept so that (a) estimated preferences and an estimated available set of commodities are compatible with an observed state of the world economy and (b) a consumption bundle intended by each government agent coincides with a consumption bundle chosen by its domestic consumers. Our major goal is to provide the existence of such an equilibrium.