On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game
通过连锁店博弈实验，发现弱势垄断者在早期会高频率地采取掠夺性定价（即打击所有进入者），这一行为偏离了克雷普斯和威尔逊的不完全信息序贯均衡模型的预测。
A single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants. There are two types of monopolists, monopolists whose single-period best response is to acquiesce after entry, and monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry. Data show high levels of predatory pricing, defined as weak monopolists fighting all entrants in early periods, both with and without experimenter-induced strong monopolists. We reject a number of predictions of the asymmetric-information, sequential equilibrium model of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and find important deviations from more general sequential equilibrium models as well.