A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
建模了非对称双寡头企业与环保组织之间的策略互动，环保组织通过威胁消费者抵制来推动绿色生产，分析了抵制何时被阻止、何时在对称信息下仍会发生，以及抵制的类型。
This article models strategic interactions between non-identical duopolistic firms and a public interest/environmental organisation (EO) that promotes 'green' production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against 'brown' producers. The article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be 'green' and, also when a boycott arises in equilibrium, despite symmetric information. When a boycott arises, it is either a small persistent boycott against the 'small firm' in the industry, or a large transitory boycott against the 'large firm' in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.