The Cost of Multiple Large Shareholders
研究发现，多个大股东的存在可能带来成本，尤其是当大股东持股比例相近时，会损害企业价值，这与以往认为大股东能抑制控股股东侵占的观点不同。
Previous research argues that large noncontrolling shareholders enhance firm value because they deter expropriation by the controlling shareholder. We propose that the conflicting incentives faced by large shareholders may induce a nonlinear relationship between the relative size of large shareholdings and firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we present evidence that there are costs to having a second (and third) largest shareholder, especially when the largest shareholdings are similar in size. Our results are robust to various relative size proxies, firm performance measures, model specifications, and potential endogeneity issues.