Endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction
研究了动态拍卖中采购方如何通过安排频繁的小规模拍卖来降低采购成本，并发现远视企业比短视企业竞争更激烈，可能削弱投标偏好政策的效果。
We show how to numerically solve for a Markov‐perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity‐constrained firms. We find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes. Otherwise, firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric, which softens competition and increases procurement costs. We also find that forward‐looking bidding dampens the competition‐softening effects of asymmetry: farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones. This can undermine the goal of a bid‐preference‐style affirmative action program: more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences.