Minimum Wage Noncompliance and the Employment Decision
用投资组合选择方法分析雇主部分不遵守最低工资法时的就业决策，发现即使部分规避法律，仍可能产生完全遵守时的就业效应，且结论适用于一般劳动市场法律。
The employment effects of minimum wage noncompliance have been the focus of several theoretical contributions to the minimum wage literature, the dominating conclusion being that the noncomplying employer, while reducing employment below the free-market level, will still employ more labor than he would if complying. Allowing, however, for partial compliance, this study applies a portfolio-choice approach to the employer's problem, concluding surprisingly that the minimum wage law may give rise to a full-compliance employment effect even if it is partially evaded. This result is further shown to hold with regard to labor market laws in general. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.