Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers
构建一个两期自然垄断模型，分析首期在位供应商投资后，买方在第二期是否引入第二来源（或收购者），探讨是否应偏袒在位者及其激励方案斜率如何变化，发现第二来源的收益不如预期，并将模型重新解释为收购情境，讨论防御策略的合意性及经理股票期权等可检验含义。
This paper considers a two-period model of natural monopoly and second sourcing.The incumbent supplier invests in the first period.After observing the incumbent's first-period performance, the buyer may breakout in the second.The investment may be transferable to the second source or not; and may be monetary or in human capital.The paper determines whether the incumbent should be favored at the reprocurement stage, and how the slope of his incentive scheme should evolve over time.It results from our analysis that the gains from second sourcing are not as high as one might hope.Last it reinterprets the second source as a raider, and the breakout as a takeover.It discusses the desirability of defensive tactics, and obtains a rich set of testable implications concerning the size of managerial stock options, the amount of defensive tactics, the firm's performance and the probability of a takeover.