Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence
构建了一个模型，分析环保组织通过游说政府（直接）和说服公众（间接）两种方式竞争政治影响力，发现两者互补，但公众说服效果或环保意识增强会导致替代，解释为何环保组织政治捐款少。
How is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying? This paper develops a model of "direct" (lobbying the government) and "indirect" (persuading the public) competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary. However, an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion, or a rise of public environmental awareness, induces substitution between the two. The findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints, but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.