R&D in the Presence of Network Externalities: Timing and Compatibility
研究两家竞争企业在网络外部性下如何决定研发时机和产品兼容性，发现网络效应可能导致企业过早推出不兼容技术，增加社会成本，而事前标准化可延迟进入并提高利润。
Two rival firms decide on the time of R&D and whether the new products should be compatible. I show that network externalities may induce the firms to introduce new incompatible technologies early, which is socially harmful as the R&D costs increase, and de facto standardization becomes less likely. Compared with the equilibrium outcome, both firms may gain by delaying the introduction of incompatible technologies. By agreeing on common standards before product introduction, entry is delayed and profit may increase. An ex post optimal standardization policy may increase the incentives for early product introduction and consequently be an undesirable policy ex ante.