Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts
研究经理与工人在无限重复关系中，经理私下观察支付工人的机会成本时，最优关系合同如何产生周期性冲突，并探讨经理如何通过非正式承诺与正式承诺管理冲突，以及流动性约束的影响。
A manager and a worker are in an infinitely repeated relationship in which the manager privately observes her opportunity costs of paying the worker. We show that the optimal relational contract generates periodic conflicts during which effort and expected profits decline gradually but recover instantaneously. To manage a conflict, the manager uses a combination of informal promises and formal commitments that evolves with the duration of the conflict. Finally, we show that liquidity constraints limit the manager's ability to manage conflicts but may also induce the worker to respond to a conflict by providing more effort rather than less.