Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement
构建卡特尔行为理论模型，利用20年起诉与信息报告数据，实证检验宽大政策对卡特尔威慑与侦测能力的影响，为反垄断执法提供依据。
The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime.