Stockholder and Bondholder Wealth Effects of CEO Incentive Grants
研究了CEO首次股票期权或限制性股票授予公告时股票和债券价格的反应，发现股票价格上涨而债券价格下跌，且反应与CEO薪酬的业绩敏感性和波动性敏感性变化相关。
We examine stock and bond price reactions to CEOs’ first stock option and/or restricted stock grants that appear on ExecuComp. We find positive stock price and negative bond price reactions. Changes in CEO pay‐performance (delta) and stock volatility (vega) sensitivities relate to the reactions. Stock reactions decrease with the change in delta and increase with the change in vega. Bond reactions are the opposite and depend on the CEO's prior equity ownership. Stockholder and bondholder wealth effects are negatively correlated for grants that cause a large change in the vega of CEO wealth, consistent with aggravated risk‐shifting incentives .