Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
研究大群体匿名随机匹配下的重复囚徒困境，证明即使无法识别对手，通过“传染性”惩罚仍可实现序贯均衡合作，且该均衡对噪音稳健、接近有效，无需过度耐心。
The paper considers the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents. Despite the informational restrictions cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by "contagious" punishments. The equilibrium does not require excessive patience, and contrary to previous thought, need not be extraordinarily fragile. It is robust to the introduction of small amounts of noise and remains nearly efficient. Extensions are discussed to models with heterogeneous rates of time preference and without public randomizations.