Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles
建模了组织在两个工人间的晋升决策，视为有限理性学习能力的问题。决策者可顺序地扭曲排名竞赛，改变信息传递。最优的末期偏向有利于领先者，而早期偏向可能偏向早期失败者，甚至降低受偏工人的晋升机会。
An organization's promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly-rational learning about ability. The decision-maker can bias noisy rank-order contests sequentially, thereby changing the information they convey. The optimal final-period bias favours the "leader" , reinforcing his likely ability advantage. When optimally biased rank-order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information, the leader is favoured in every period. In other environments, bias in early periods may (i) favour the early loser, (ii) be optimal even when the workers are equally rated, and (iii) reduce the favoured worker's promotion chances.