Dynamic Political Choice in Macroeconomics
在动态宏观框架下分析再分配、社会保险和公共品供给的政治理论，通过重复投票和利益冲突解释政府规模的跨国差异，认为这种差异可能源于对福利国家稳固性的自我实现预期。
We analyze positive theories of redistribution, social insurance and public good provision in a dynamic macroeconomic framework. Political outcomes are determined via repeated voting and driven by a conflict of interests between agents. Voters and politicians rationally forecast the impact of current political choices on future political and economic outcomes. The theory is consistent with large differences in the size of governments across societies. These need not rely on intrinsic differences in preferences or technology, but may be driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the robustness of the welfare state.