Selection of Borrowing Partners in Joint Liability–Based Microcredit: Evidence from Framed Field Experiments in Bangladesh
通过孟加拉国农村小企业主的实地框架实验，研究连带责任小额信贷中借贷伙伴的选择，发现风险不同的借款人会通过补偿支付形成异质风险匹配的群体，并讨论了这对弱制度环境下小企业生存和融资的影响。
We analyze partner selection decisions in the formation of borrowing groups in joint liability–based microcredit. We do so within the context of a framed field experiment with the owners of small businesses in rural Bangladesh. We find that when, irrespective of their project status, borrowers are required to make joint liability payments, risky borrowers will offer side payments that are sufficiently large to attract safe borrowers, leading to the formation of heterogeneous risk–matched groups. We discuss the implications of heterogeneous risk matching for the survival and success of small enterprises, and their financiers, in countries with a weak institutional environment.