Capital Accumulation and Annuities in an Adverse Selection Economy
研究竞争性年金市场中的逆向选择如何导致部分寿命不确定的个体选择私人资本积累，尽管年金回报率更高，并分析这种配置的福利性质，发现资本积累过度，讨论消除低效率的政策。
This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity-constrained equilibria in which some agents, whose length of lifetime is uncertain, find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on annuities. The welfare properties of these allocations are analyzed. It is shown that the level of capital accumulation is excessive in a Paretian sense. Policies that eliminate this inefficiency are discussed. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.